

CONCEPT NOTE

Implementing agency	UNDP Tajikistan
Project title	Strengthening coordination, early recovery and early warning in Tajikistan
Targeted Beneficiaries	Vulnerable groups affected by disasters and crisis, REACT partners, governmental institutions
Project partners	REACT Partners, Committee of Emergency Situations
Project duration	12 months, February 2009 – January 2010
Total Project Budget	\$ 463,952
Donors	DFID (\$400,000), UNDP (\$63,952)

I. Introduction

Tajikistan is vulnerable to a number of natural hazards such as earthquakes, landslides, floods and extreme climate conditions, causing acute vulnerability; while at the same time dealing with underlying structural vulnerabilities. During the winter of 2007-2008 Tajikistan experienced a “Compound Crisis”, as the exceptionally cold weather across Central Asia caused breakdowns in the country’s energy infrastructure, damaged winter crops, and reduced livestock herds. It is anticipated that additional humanitarian needs will arise during the 2008-2009 winter period, as a result of winter-related hardships, including limits on household and industrial electricity deliveries effective 1 September 2008.

An appeal for assistance was first launched on 18 February 2008. The appeal sought USD 25,192,839 to address the needs of two million people affected by the compound crises through international partners (seven United Nations agencies and five international NGOs) and Government of Tajikistan. The appeal generated some USD 15 million dollars; while more than USD 22 million dollars was generated outside the framework of the appeal in the form of bilateral donations.

Joint food security, livelihoods, agriculture and nutrition needs assessments conducted at the end of April in rural areas and in June 2008 in urban areas, found some 2.2 million people (34% of the rural population and 37% of the urban population) to be food insecure, of which approximately 800,000 are severely food insecure (including a very poor food intake) and require immediate support to ensure a minimally adequate level of nutrition.

In September 2008 The Consolidated Appeal has been prepared in consultation with the Government of Tajikistan, donors, and jointly by the UN agencies and NGOs involved in relief activities. The immediate aim of the appeal is to provide a temporary safety net to the most vulnerable poor people in urban and rural areas through the provision of food and cash. The appeal also aims to avoid a prolonged relief situation by supporting the agriculture sector through the next planting and harvest cycle and the rehabilitation of critical infrastructure.

A multi-sectoral preparedness plan is being developed and early warning indicators are being closely monitored. This will feed into the regular monitoring of the response to the humanitarian needs and the appeal will be expanded to reflect new needs if necessary.

II. Needs Analysis

The response to the Flash Appeal was managed through REACT network, clusters and the UN Resident Coordinator’s Office. Coordination support was provided by OCHA in the form of two humanitarian officers for three months (funded by DFID) and regular support from the OCHA Regional Office in Almaty, as well as the REACT Secretariat (UNDP Disaster Risk

Management Programme staff). REACT held regular coordination meetings and there was strong involvement of REACT members at the Cluster level.

A review of the Flash Appeal indicated the overall strength of the REACT structure and identified a number of challenges (*See attachment 1 for Compound Crisis Lessons Learned Report*).

Although a survey of REACT members indicated relatively positive views of the cluster system, some challenges proved rather persistent; such as the lack of clarity of roles and responsibilities of Cluster Leads vis-à-vis their agency-specific and Cluster-specific responsibilities; lack of attention to cross-cutting issues; and essentially a lack of capacity to effectively coordinate all activated clusters throughout the duration of the emergency.

As the response to the humanitarian needs continues in Tajikistan, there is a clear need to increase support at the RC level to ensure effective inter-cluster coordination and attention to cross cutting issues. This goal can be accomplished by employing Humanitarian Affairs Officer (*see attachment 2 for ToR of HAO*) for specific areas of coordination support, which includes the following:

1. Personal support to the RC/RR to backstop the day-to-day activities undertaken within the Flash Appeal, CAP and any other possible humanitarian intervention;
2. Support REACT Secretariat and specific Clusters to mentor current and new national staff to improve the quality of existing coordination and information exchange systems;
3. Specific support to the Clusters to improve operations (through the Global Clusters);
4. Expanded information management and integrated early warning capacities;
5. Develop a data collection system feeding into an early warning system;
6. Support the Early Recovery efforts covering all the sectors including HEALTH, Food Security, WASH, Shelter/NFI and etc;
7. Establish more robust monitoring and evaluation system for the emergency response.

One of the challenges during the response to compound crisis was that employees with largely developmental responsibilities were overloaded with additional humanitarian tasks while receiving limited support or guidance from the global cluster system. UNDP initiated Early Recovery, by hiring an Early Recovery Advisor for 3 months. An Early Recovery Framework was developed; Early Recovery network within clusters has been established. However activities have not been truly integrated in the humanitarian response and rehabilitation phase following the departure of the consultant. Therefore, in order to follow up and fill the gap by incorporating Early Recovery to humanitarian response, there is a need to further support Early Recovery interventions in Tajikistan, which will bridge the gap between immediate relief and long term development programming (*See attachment 3 for Early Recovery Initiative for Tajikistan*).

With the support of DFID and USAID, UNDP conducted Central Asian Regional Risk Assessment, mostly concentrating on Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Initial findings of this assessment highlight major issues faced by the Government as well as the international community while responding to the crisis. One of the key findings is the lack of comprehensive early warning system neither within the governmental structures, nor within the international community operating in the country. One of the major recommendations of the assessment is to establish a data collection system feeding into an early warning system. Due to country-wide scale of emergency this was particularly true for the coordination structures under the UN Resident Coordinator. Therefore, in order to enhance in-country capacities for information management, there is a great need in establishing an early warning mechanism that will ensure continued data collection and assessment of possible crisis situations (*See attachment 4 for Early Warning System in Tajikistan*).

In order to assist Humanitarian Affairs Officer and the UN Country Team in Tajikistan with the establishment of the Early Warning System, a National Consultant will be hired. The National Consultant will work with HAO, REACT partners, UNCT and UNDP Disaster Risk Management Programme in the implementation of the Early Warning System initiative (*See attachment 5 for ToR of National Consultant*).

Additional assistance will support the interlinking of coordination, information and advocacy services to facilitate timely, efficient and safe delivery of humanitarian assistance. It will also support the review and adjustment of current inter-agency and cluster coordination mechanisms with the aim of strengthening processes of consultation, transparency and accountability in line with the humanitarian reform agenda including through the strengthening of clusters, principles of partnership and review of humanitarian financing mechanisms. Continued support from OCHA (through its Regional Office in Almaty) for the humanitarian coordination structures in Tajikistan will be pursued.

III. Objectives

- Strengthened coordination, planning, information and secretariat services at the national and regional levels via the office of RC and REACT structures;
- Immediate recommendations from Central Asian Regional Risk Assessment implemented (*See attachment 6 for subtracks from CA RRA on Immediate Recommendations*);
- Data Collection System on Early Warning established;
- REACT Early Warning indicators strengthened;
- Cluster approach application evaluated and recommendations for improved coordination implemented;
- Assessments conducted to identify needs through common approach to needs assessments, analysis and impact evaluation;
- Information products developed to support the humanitarian response by highlighting priority needs, gaps and overlaps;
- Strategic joint planning and advocacy ensured to promote principles for humanitarian interventions;
- Early Recovery facilitated in all sectors including Health, Wash, Shelter/NFI and etc.

A. Indicators

- Number of agencies participating in REACT meetings, cluster and ad hoc thematic meetings in Dushanbe and district levels;
- Response plans agreed, implemented and monitored;
- Number of new and updated information products disseminated on a regular basis;
- Number of assessments conducted and recommendations implemented;
- Number of trainings/meetings on humanitarian principles, Early Recovery and Early Warning held for partners and local authorities, etc;
- Data collection system for analysis of early warning established.

B. Monitoring of Objectives and Indicators

REACT meetings will continue to track operational program challenges. Records of meetings, minutes with clearly defined action points will be an integral part of the ongoing progress review. The review and reflection of partner agencies will be regularly sought with a view to improve the outputs.

Regular in-house reviews will also assess and refine the information on the website. Advocacy for humanitarian principles will be tracked through monitoring reports as well as attendance of meetings.

Attachment 1 to DFID's Concept Note

2008 Tajikistan Compound Crisis – Lessons Learned¹

This is an initial listing of lessons learned from the response to the 2008 winter Compound Crisis in Tajikistan. The listing is intended for circulation for comment, amendments and the addition of additional lessons.

1. We faced difficulty in understanding onset of a compound crisis, in part because of the different warning signs of the different disaster threads, but also because of the lack of warning systems attuned to the warning signs. The compound crisis crept up, even though the signs of a possible disaster were evident (in retrospect) as early as the fall of 2007.
2. Normal early warning systems were not adapted to the multiple indicators found in a compound crisis. What is needed is better analysis rather than just a monitoring of warning indicators.
3. Gaining consensus on the existence of a compound crisis was difficult. This was, above all, because of the cross-sectoral nature of the disaster, requiring responders to look outside their areas of expertise to make sense of what is happening.
4. Understanding the immediate impact of weather, which was unusually cold for a long period of time, was a challenge. While cold weather is normal in winter it was hard to clearly define what was too much cold for too long, the two factors which caused the severe impact in urban areas.
5. Rural areas were initially considered to be more prepared for cold weather because they were used to dealing with cold weather with their own resources each year. However, field surveys found that the rural areas were also affected both by the usually low temperatures. This impact occurred both due to the needs for additional heating and damage to food supplies from freezing, impacts hard to define as they were occurring. .
6. It was hard to do assessments during winter. Innovative approaches are needed, as with the REACT survey of NGOs on the impact of cold weather.
7. Making a case for assistance to urban areas was a significant challenge. There was suspicion of our request for assistance to urban populations. These areas are considered more privileged and not generally in need of assistance compared to rural areas.
8. Accomplishing infrastructure response to disaster impacts (e.g., improving electrical, water and sanitation services), was time consuming and not done quickly. Efforts to make repairs to water systems in Dushanbe, K-Tube and Khujant were too complicated to have immediate impacts. More targeted, smaller scale efforts to address water problems in Kuylob were more successful.
9. Getting government bureaucracies to do things quickly was a challenge. The most immediately successful relief efforts were at the local level.
10. There was resistance to recognizing the compound crisis because of the implication that this recognition indicated that the government was not able to deliver basic services.

¹ Drafted by: C. Kelly, DRMP Disaster Planning Consultant, UNDP Tajikistan, email: 72734.2412@compuserve.com

11. Taking time to develop a consensus (or acquiesce) among donors on the disaster problem and solutions was worth the time involved as it allowed quick funding when the appeal was issued. We may have lost a week in consensus building, but gained more than a week in quick funding.
12. Integration of the Clusters into REACT worked, but the function of REACT was not clear to many who came from outside Tajikistan to work on the disaster. This led to several attempts to duplicate REACT capacities by individual Clusters.
13. Briefing of incoming staff on REACT and disaster management procedures in Tajikistan was not always effective and at times led to efforts to impose duplicative management structures.
14. In the case of the Tajikistan crisis, the CERF mechanism did not provide immediate funding. Donors have mechanisms which are quicker and more effective.
15. There are indications that CERF funding replaced donor funding as in the suggestion from some donors that the UN RC/RR use the CERF as the donors had provided funds to the CERF for the emergencies.
16. CERF and Flash Appeal proposals are best done at the same time, since the information and analysis needed for each is basically the same. In fact, the two should be combined.
17. The OCHA office in Almay provided sustained support to Tajikistan including providing someone to lead the development of the Flash Appeal and support the deployment of OCHA staff to Dushanbe.
18. Most staff involved in developing the Flash Appeal were not experienced in the process or requirements needed for quick analysis of limited data or in the design of quick implementation projects required for an emergency response. There is a need for sufficient additional technical assistance to support non-emergency staff in developing emergency proposals in a very short time frame.
19. Specifications for non-food items were not generally known. Developing and incorporating specifications for non-food item requests delayed the procurement and delivery of these items. Specifications need to be established in advance of the disaster. (This has now been done in Tajikistan.)
20. Intra-UN administrative procedures prevented the use of local emergency stockpiles for the disaster response.
21. Staffing-up by OCHA from the “surge capacity” was slow and did not provide individuals with key skills (e.g., Russian language capacity).
22. There was initially poor understanding of the concept and operation of the Cluster approach. This created unnecessary tensions between Cluster Leads and cluster members, and reduced the effectiveness of the Cluster approach. (We experienced many of the problems which the Cluster Approach was intended to avoid.)
23. We attempted to organized training on the Cluster approach but found it hard to organize through the normal channels and were unsuccessful. We probably should have decided to run our own Cluster training using the standard HRSU package.

24. Information sharing and collaboration was a problem for some Clusters, although good for others.

25. Humanitarian standards and norms were not applied to many of the Flash Appeal projects, making it hard to measure or assess outcomes or outputs. Further, there was no consolidated reporting of project-level progress, making it unclear if the Flash Appeal-funded projects actually accomplished anything.

26. We should have requested Clusters mobilization before the Flash Appeal. This would have allowed the mobilization of human resources to improve the analysis used in the Appeal and the programming of immediate response. However, since the Flash Appeal is the de facto declaration of a disaster by the UN, it is unclear how to justify the Clusters without providing the analysis found in the Flash Appeal.

27. The management arrangements for the Shelter Cluster are illogical. This key cluster should not be left without a lead organization 4 months into the disaster.

IFRC and UNHCR should short out this problem and not leave the Cluster head-less. The functioning of a Cluster is the responsibility of the Cluster Leads. It is inconsistent with the whole concept of the Clusters to create a gap in coverage and to leave it to the local UNDP office to try to sort out a working arrangement for the Cluster.

28. Assessments need to be updated regularly and the basis for analysis in these assessments should be validated on a regular basis. The Shelter Cluster assessment indicating an elevated Spring Flood risk was useful, but the failure to regularly review and validate the basis of the analysis led to a delayed recognition that the actual risk of flooding was less than projected².

29. There is little donor support for preparedness.

30. We did not work hard enough to secure funding for underfunded elements of the Flash Appeal, e.g., food security and education. It is unclear who is responsible for leading the funding effort for each Flash Appeal sector, and particularly calling attention to underfunded sectors.

31. While the compound crisis had a major impact on the agriculture and livestock sectors, funding for relief and recovery projects was limited and left considerable emergency needs unmet.

32. We did not communicate effectively on the impacts of the compound crisis and our responses after the Flash Appeal was issued. Only 9 sitreps were issued over 5 months, with no special reports on disaster or assistance impact.

33. REACT and Heads of Cluster meetings were effective in discussing policy and practical issues.

34. There was considerable turn-over in short term emergency program staff. The Shelter Cluster had 8 persons come in and out in 7 weeks. WASH/Unicef had three persons come in and leave over 8 weeks. Three persons came in for the Logistics Cluster, then left with work incomplete, to be replaced with a longer term person several weeks later. FAO had three heads of office since the Flash Appeal launch.

² It would logically be the responsibility of a Cluster to continue to review and update their assessments on a regular basis. In the case of Spring Floods, the departure of IFRC from the Cluster left a capacity gap which was not met. However, most other Clusters did not update their initial assessments even at the time of the Flash Appeal update.

35. The response by some Clusters, particularly Logistics and Shelter, was rapid and could be considered to be initially effective. Other Global Clusters Leads were not as rapid or possibly as effective. The deployment scheme of surge capacity for more protracted emergencies should be adapted and able to provide 1 (or 2 persons depending on the workload) present from surge capacity within each cluster for at least 3 month period.

36. The UN RC/RR has limited capacities to manage a disaster of the scope and scale of the Compound Crisis. Direct OCHA assistance was critical but only available for 90 days. It is unclear how a UN program the size of that found in Tajikistan can sustain a multi-month, multi-disaster response without significant staffing-up. Where funding for this staffing-up will come from is unclear.

37. The World Bank accomplished significant progress with the GoT on addressing the energy crisis, but did so without any real reference to the humanitarian community in Tajikistan. This led to a disjointed response and a lack of coordination between the GoT and the humanitarian community.

38. High level discussions with the GoT on the nature of the Compound Crisis and effective response methods should have been pursued more forcefully.

39. Pre-disaster tensions between donors and the government created an atmosphere of distrust in the initial stages of the response, and issues not directly related to the Compound Crisis crept into, and made more complex, discussions about the disaster response.

40. The establishment of the Food Security Cluster was effective in bring together different actors around a single clear focus. This single approach enabled an environment which led to a combined FAO-UNICEF-WFP food security-livelihoods assessment, a process which has resulted in a significant advance in our understanding of the nature of the compound crisis.

Attachment 2 to DFID's Concept Note

Terms of Reference Humanitarian Affairs Officer (L-3/NOC or NOD)

Background

Tajikistan is vulnerable to a number of natural hazards such as earthquakes, landslides, floods and extreme climate conditions, causing acute vulnerability; while at the same time dealing with underlying structural vulnerabilities. During the winter of 2007-2008 Tajikistan experienced what was labelled a "compound crisis", as the exceptionally cold weather across Central Asia caused breakdowns in the country's energy infrastructure, damaged winter crops, and reduced livestock herds.

Slower economic growth, a reduction in critical public services and significantly higher food prices resulted—which were subsequently exacerbated by global trends and by the onset of drought conditions in the spring. Limited alternate sources of income and poor general nutrition have all contributed to an emerging food crisis which will likely extend into the summer of 2009. It is anticipated that additional humanitarian needs will arise during the 2008-2009 winter period, as a result of winter-related hardships, including limits on household and industrial electricity deliveries effective 1 September.

An appeal for assistance was first launched on 18 February 2008. The appeal sought USD 25,192,839 to help international partners (seven United Nations agencies and five international NGOs) support the Government of Tajikistan in addressing the needs of two million people affected by the compound crises. The appeal generated some USD 14 million dollars; while some USD 21 million dollars was generated outside the framework of the appeal in the form of bilateral donations.

Joint food security, livelihoods, agriculture and nutrition needs assessments conducted at the end of April in rural areas and in June 2008 in urban areas, found some 2.2 million people (34% of the rural population and 37% of the urban population) to be food insecure, of which approximately 800,000 are severely food insecure (including a very poor food intake) and require immediate support to ensure a minimally adequate level of nutrition.

In September 2008 The Consolidated Appeal has been prepared in consultation with the Government of Tajikistan, donors, and jointly by the UN agencies and NGOs involved in relief activities. The immediate aim of the appeal is to provide a temporary safety net to the most vulnerable poor people in urban and rural areas through the provision of food and cash. The appeal also aims to avoid a prolonged relief situation by supporting the agriculture sector through the next planting and harvest cycle and the rehabilitation of critical infrastructure.

While the food security situation is the most immediate concern and the focus of the present appeal, additional funding may be later required to fill gaps in the Government's plan of action for the winter and to deal with the potential humanitarian impacts of continuing drought conditions. A multi-sectoral preparedness plan is being developed and early warning indicators are being closely monitored. This will feed into the regular monitoring of the response to the humanitarian needs and the appeal will be expanded to reflect new needs if necessary. With its current focus mainly on food security, this is not a classic consolidated appeal, but may be converted into one if and when other sector plans are added.

The duration of the appeal is 15 months, from October 2008 to December 2009, and the total amount needed is \$34,746,555. Funding for the emergency humanitarian needs in this Humanitarian Appeal is also being sought from the CERF.

Coordination arrangements

Emergency response to sudden onset natural disasters is normally managed through the Rapid Emergency Assessment and Coordination Team (REACT); Tajikistan's Disaster Management Partnership comprising the National Committee of Emergency Situations (COES), civil society, NGOs, the Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan and United Nations agencies (including FAO, UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, WFP and WHO). The cluster approach was activated in response to the compound crisis and serves as the sectoral coordination mode under REACT.

The response to the winter energy crisis in Tajikistan was being led by a special committee under the leadership of the Ministry of Economy.

OCHA is not present in Tajikistan but is supporting the RC and the UNCT through the Regional Disaster Response Advisor office based in Almaty, Kazakhstan.

Duties of the Humanitarian Affairs Officer

The position of Humanitarian Affairs Officer has been identified to assist the humanitarian community in Tajikistan in preparing itself for and providing a coordinated response to humanitarian needs emanating from acute and chronic vulnerability.

The incumbent will act as focal point for OCHA and provide the essential interface between the UN system and the national bodies responsible for humanitarian assistance, the Committee on Emergency Situations (COES) and the Ministry of Economy. He or she will be working under the supervision of the RC and be part of the REACT secretariat (UNDP DRMP Team).

A. Support the humanitarian clusters in humanitarian affairs coordination

- Support the Resident Coordinator in his role of coordinating international humanitarian response in the country, as part of REACT or the Committee under the leadership of the Ministry of Economy, in particular with regards to ensuring that strategic and operational coordination mechanisms supporting disaster preparedness and response are set-up and functioning well, according to the principles laid out in international policy;
- Liaise with all relevant UN agencies, NGOs, donors and local authorities, with the aim of facilitating coordination and consensus-building;
- Participate in donor coordination forums in this practise area aimed at a common approach to medium and long term reduction of vulnerability in Tajikistan;
- Participate in the Government led humanitarian coordination structures if and where appropriate and assist the resident Coordinator in the Task Force policy meetings;
- Share reports and assessments concerning humanitarian/emergency related information amongst government, UNCT, donors, NGOs, Red Cross and other relevant parties;
- Participate in the development of short and medium-term strategies for addressing humanitarian needs, such as Flash Appeals, consolidated appeals, mid-term reviews and other humanitarian strategy documents;
- Ensure adequate integration of cross cutting issues such as HIV/AIDS, gender and environmental concerns into assessment and response;
- Monitor, analyse and report on developments in the country and their impact on the humanitarian situation and prepare regularly situation reports;
- Monitor the emergence of possible new disasters (e.g., floods, landslides) which may require changes to the on-going disaster response, and identify needed changes to assistance programs if these events occur.
- Ensure adequate and appropriate (process-sound, defensible) assessments are conducted and updated;
- Collect information on program impact and gap analysis, and regularly share this analysis with the RC, the UNCT and the REACT Core Group;
- Ensure effective interface with OCHA Almaty including input for information management tools such as who-does-what-where, contact databases, key documents, maps and calendar of events;
- Liaise with OCHA, principally through the Almaty Regional Office, on coordination and reporting. Ensure UN reporting requirements are met in a timely manner.
- Support the REACT secretariat to collate and disseminate key information regarding emergency preparedness and response;
- Provide accurate, sufficient and timely information to the UN Info/Media Officer, when required, to ensure press releases are produced;
- Assist in the mobilisation of resources;

B. Support the in-country IASC in disaster risk management

- Support inter-agency contingency planning; ensure that individual agencies' contingency plans are consistent and well-coordinated;
- Ensure that the inter-agency plan is customised to the national preparedness plan; participate in national preparedness planning activities; organise joint planning sessions;

- Analyse preparedness gaps and apply the cluster approach to ensure stand-by agreements to fill the gaps;
- Liaise with other UN agencies to complete tasks as set out in UN preparedness and response plans; and regularly brief the UN-CT;
- Develop sound early warning and ensure standard operating procedures are put in place that stipulate who will do what and who will be responsible for what during the different alert phases;
- Ensure integration and linkages between disaster preparedness and response and the longer-term UN development assistance to Tajikistan, including mainstreaming of disaster risk reduction into joint programmes and strategies, thematic areas and inter-agency planning processes;
- Be informed on donor activities related to disaster risk reduction, including social protection and safety net programmes;

Qualifications:

Education: University degree in political science, sociology, law, international relations, or related field; or the equivalent combination of education and experience in a related area.

Experience: Minimum of five years of progressively responsible relevant professional experience in humanitarian coordination, emergency preparedness, crisis/emergency relief management, rehabilitation and development, or other related area, of which at least three years of relevant (field) and international experience in coordination of natural disasters and humanitarian emergencies response.

Personal skills: Excellent communication (especially writing), negotiation and diplomatic skills; strong analytical skills; comfortable working with a variety of people within a multicultural environment; able to work and follow up independently; ability to work under pressure and adhere to tight deadlines; strong work ethic and commitment; organised, resourceful and a team player.

Languages: Fluent in English both verbal and written. Fluency in Tajik, Farsie or Russian an asset.

Computer skills: Good operational and advanced user skills in basic computer software programmes (excel, word processing, PowerPoint etc.)

Duration:

The post is for an initial period of 1 year, with the possibility of an extension.

Attachment 3 to DFID's Concept Note

Early Recovery Initiative in Tajikistan

Background

Tajikistan is a highly disaster prone mountainous country, and is located in one of the world's most active seismic zones (Pamir-Alai, Hindukush) and is exposed to almost daily mudslides, rockslides, floods and avalanches. On average, the country suffers nearly 500 disasters per year.

Here in Tajikistan, during the past 10 years Tajikistan has requested nearly \$400,000,000 USD in emergency aid and in the past two years alone has requested \$48,854,358 USD. Wherein the majority of these money in the past was spent on Food aid, NFI's and other direct relief efforts; there does seem to be a shift in the request types in the last two years where now we can see a larger amount of aid being spent on reduction, and mitigation efforts, but these efforts need to be enhanced so that the country can fully enter a sustainable development progression. (Source UN FTS)

On 21 February 2008, the cluster approach was activated in Tajikistan, following the Compound Crises Flash Appeal 2008. Building on the earlier sector groups within Rapid Emergency Assessment and Coordination Team (REACT), which UN agencies, NGO's, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) provide coordination support, and put into service the following clusters: 1) food security, 2) water and sanitation, 3) education, 4) logistics, 5) shelter and non-food items NFIs, 6) energy and 7) early warning.

The planning horizon for the appeal was for six months; from 15 February to 15 August 2008, with the introduction of the ER advisor in June efforts were made to synchronize short-term humanitarian aid to middle- and longer-term development intervention.

So far no ER cluster group has been formed, but it has been suggested that instead of forming an additional cluster, Early Recovery Focal Points (ERFP) should be designated in each of the existing REACT sector/ clusters, to be coordinated by an Early Recovery Officer. It is thought that this approach will help facilitate and streamline early recovery efforts within the current emergency and mid to long term efforts, capitalizing on the strengths of the existing REACT system without imposing an additional layer of human resources to already understaffed coordination mechanisms.

The objective of the ERFP will be to enhance the capacity for a comprehensive response mechanism allowing for greater effectiveness in supporting the Resident Coordinator in implementing recovery and integrating risk and vulnerability reduction measures at the very early stages of emergencies.

Concepts of Early Recovery

Early Recovery is the acknowledged relationship between emergencies and development, intended to create greater linkages between the two in order to produce mutual advantages between relief and development actors and recipients. The goals of Early Recovery Programs are to enable a smoother transition to long-term development through the argumentation of the humanitarian efforts, by addressing a critical gap in the coverage between humanitarian relief and long-term recovery; between reliance and self-sufficiency.

- Recovery programming seeks to help people recover or improve upon their pre disaster living conditions and strengthen and sustain the impact of relief activities.

- Recovery programming can link relief activities to longer term community support programs in health and disaster management – and link broader disaster response to the development programs of governments and humanitarian partners. Recovery programming allows us to address the underlying causes of vulnerability to disasters.

A continuum or holistic approach assumes the need for the simultaneous delivery of humanitarian aid, rehabilitation and development. It is based on the idea that although people are in the midst of a crisis, they have different capacities and needs beyond mere survival. This reflects the ways in which people are affected by crises. In emergencies, survival is a primary concern, but so too is ensuring one's livelihood, because people must recover in the long term, once the emergency is over.

Objective

The Early Recovery initiative aims to bridge the gap between immediate relief and long-term reconstruction. It will focus on identifying concrete interventions that may be implemented on an immediate basis. It sets out a number of strategic principles and directions for each sector of intervention that will help guide activities for improved aid effectiveness. The initiative will guide recovery interventions that aim to:

- Bridge the gap between immediate relief and long term reconstruction;
- Support spontaneous recovery efforts of the communities;
- Prepare the ground for sustainable long term reconstruction;
- Reduce future disaster risks.

In order to reach the above mentioned aims, Early Recovery Plan will be developed through:

- Identifying the existing local capacities and capacity-building priorities;
- Identifying the ongoing development initiatives that can be built upon or re-oriented to contribute to the early recovery process;
- Defining the underlying causes that generated or exacerbated the crisis;
- Identifying the negative coping mechanisms resulting from a crisis that can perpetuate the detrimental effects of a crisis or create new risks, and the spontaneous initiatives that can be strengthened to rebuild livelihoods and stabilise human security;

Early recovery plan must be nationally owned and led by the Government of Tajikistan. For this, consensus on Early Recovery Plan between the government, UN agencies, international community and donors should be reached. Such consensus is needed for exchange information purpose that will help to develop a strategic plan and policies for early recovery; and a portfolio of integrated projects for early recovery, which will be implemented by all involved parties. In addition, it will help to generate reliable baseline data to feed into a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation system.

Steps to approach Early Recovery Assessment by phases:

Phase 1. Mobilizing support and resources- Responsible sides: Government,UNDP/Partners to mobilize support at highest level;

Phase 2. Establish coordination and oversight mechanism. Consultative meetings with decision makers convened by government of Tajikistan-Responsible side: HAO and local staff;

- Define the scope and level (national, local) and expected outputs of the assessment;

- Identify in-country capacity for participating in the assessment and identify capacity gaps and requirements for additional support;
- Generate agreements on roles and responsibilities and the implementation mechanism for assessing early recovery needs, including calling on additional resources (Consultants and Early Recovery Advisor);

Phase 3. Choosing a methodological framework – answering questions such as: what depth of information is required? What baseline indicators describe the situation? Information availability and reliability;

Phase 4. Ensuring participation and leadership by national counterparts through developing an Early Recovery Framework and Strategy;

Phase 5. Translating finding into action: Findings and recommendations to be translated into specific response objectives and targets;

Outcomes:

1. Established coordination and oversight mechanism;
2. Stand by support capacity and resources for immediate mobilization;
3. Developed Joint Early Recovery Strategy and Plan;

Attachment 4 to DFID's Concept Note

Early Warning System in Tajikistan

Introduction

Severely cold winter of 2007-08 year underlined the chronic problems that Tajikistan has been having since the independence. Problems such as food insecurity, lack of electricity generation and heavy dependence on import of energy and food, have been doubled by unusual cold winter. It caused complete breakdowns in Tajikistan's energy infrastructure, and reduced winter crop yields and livestock herds. Millions of people spent weeks in exceptionally cold winter conditions without access to reliable heating and electricity services; economic growth slowed down as food and energy security were adversely affected. These problems were exacerbated by global food and energy price trends, and subsequently by the onset of drought in the spring and summer across the region. The drought conditions in turn exacerbated the low water levels in the hydro power stations that generate the bulk of the electricity consumed in Tajikistan. The generation capacities had been taxed by exceptionally high demands for heat and electricity during the winter months.

Notwithstanding the presence of development programming portfolios and humanitarian response instruments, and despite the legacies of annual appeals for donor assistance, the Government of Tajikistan, United Nations agencies, and the international community were unable to quickly and effectively respond to the humanitarian challenges presented by compound threats to energy and food securities.³ One of the key findings of CA RRA report funded by UNDP, DFID, and USAID, was that because of inefficiencies of existing early warning systems in Tajikistan, both government and humanitarian communities were unable to see the threat of multilayer crisis during the winter of 2007-2008. Neither could they comprehend the nature of such compound crisis to undertake appropriate pre-emptive, early recovery responses.⁴

These failures outline the problems of timely data availability and the quality of the data collection system, which would regularly monitor set of indicators in energy, water and food security areas. Although each humanitarian sector might have had their own monitoring tools and systems, for crisis of such compound nature all sectors had to coordinate their humanitarian response activities. Therefore, another key finding of CA RRA was lack of coordination between the humanitarian communities and local government and lack of access to the governmental information.

Needs Analysis

Geographically, Tajikistan remains as a vulnerable country to a number of natural and manmade hazards. Therefore, there is a strong need to establish early warning system for timely revealing the risk of repetition of such crisis and ensure mitigation of the consequences of the disaster.

Based on lessons learnt, UNDP in Tajikistan within its Disaster Risk Management Programme (the latter acting as a secretariat of Rapid Emergency Assessment and Coordination Team (REACT)) has developed a simple but tractable early warning system focusing on five variables⁵. However, during the process of data collection, organization continuously faced with challenges in accessing and interpreting related data from the government. Therefore, the quality of the early warning report, time wise and reliability wise, leaves some rooms for improvements.

³ CA RRA report from December, 2008, p.3

⁴ Ibid., p.11

⁵ These are precipitation, remittances, food prices, electricity generation, and water levels at the Nurek hydropower station. For any questions or suggestions, contact react.dushanbe@undp.org.

With such assessment in hand, one of recommendations made in the CA RRA was further improving early warning mechanism in Tajikistan by means of establishing long term cooperation with the governmental institutions responsible for certain areas⁶ and creating a board of experts. Board of experts will include both personnel of related governmental institutions and international humanitarian consultants. Such cooperation between the governmental officials and the international sector will facilitate the data collection process. In addition, it will help to get Government of Tajikistan, donors and humanitarian community on the same “page” and improve coordination and cooperation between them. It will also enhance national capacity in disaster related information management, thus ensuring long-term sustainability of the system.

Objectives

To enhance national capacity in disaster risk information management by means of establishing early warning mechanism.

Tasks

- In close consultation with the experts from selected Institutions (eg. Strategic Research Center under the President of Republic of Tajikistan or NGO) and REACT partners, determine types of warning indicators;
- Determine source of information for the above mentioned indicators and establish regular data collection system;
- Establish board of experts for each indicator for interpretation of the data;
- Establish a room/centre for the board of experts (preferably within the premises of selected institution);
- Make agreements with local state agencies on information support; also develop memorandum of understanding between governmental and international experts
- Together with the governmental agencies, define the term of “classified” information to avoid future conflicting arguments;
- Organize and coordinate trainings on International Standards for Data Collection for partners/volunteers (including REACT members) as well as for board of experts;
- Develop standard operating procedures for early warning stipulating responsibilities during the different alert phases;
- Develop the format of early warning/situational report;
- Determine the recipients and the size of publication;
- Conduct weekly meetings of board of experts for entering data updates and making analysis of the situation;
- Ensure bi-weekly publications of analytical situational report on Early Warning and its dissemination to all REACT members, donors and all related state officials;
- Develop a strategy for self-financing mechanism the project;

Outputs

1. Early Warning Center will be established with relevant equipment and communication means;
2. Data collection system for early warning will be established in Tajikistan;

⁶ Ibid., p.12

Activity timeframe:

Tasks	Timeframe	Responsible group/person	Results	Impact
Determine types of warning indicators	First month of the project	All involved parties	Early Warning Tool for constant monitoring	Better preparedness and efficient mitigation of crisis
Determine source of information	First and Second month of the project	DRMP/Selected partners;	Established regular data collection system;	Constant situation awareness of concerned parties;
Make agreements with local state agencies on information support/make a memorandum of understanding between the governmental and international experts;	Second month of the project	DRMP/ Selected partners;	Easy access to required data and information/ Timely and reliable situational report	Accurate assessment
a. Establish board of experts b. Establish a room/centre for the board of experts (within the premises of selected institution);	Second month of the project	DRMP/ Selected partners;	Continuous analytical research	Capacity building/disaster management efficiency
Weekly meeting of board of experts for exchange information	Throughout the project	DRMP/ Board of Experts and selected partners;	Enhanced exchange of information	Better awareness on the situation/better coordination and management of the situation;
Trainings on International Standards for Data Collection for groups involved in the project	Third and the fourth months	DRMP	- Better qualified data collectors; -Standardized data collection methodology	More reliable information fit in international standard
a. Ensure biweekly publication of analytical situational report on Early Warning; b. Dissemination to all REACT members, donors and all related state officials;	Throughout the project	DRMP/Board of Experts and selected partners;	Better awareness/better coordination of humanitarian actions	More efficient response to the risks of disaster
Develop a strategy for financial self-sustainability of the project	A month following the end of the project	DRMP/Selected partner;	continuously functioning center disregard the status of international funding	Better national capacity

Attachment 5 to DFID's Concept Note

Terms of Reference for National Consultant

UNDP Disaster Risk Management Programme

Duty Station: Dushanbe, with possible travel to other locations in Tajikistan

Duration: 11 months (February– December 2009)

Application deadline: 20 January 2009

I. Background

Exceptionally cold weather during the winter of 2007-2008 caused breakdowns in the country's energy infrastructure and damaged winter crops and reduced livestock herds. It has also significantly increased water, energy, and food insecurities which were subsequently exacerbated by higher global food prices and by the onset of drought conditions in the spring and summer. The government and humanitarian organisations working in Tajikistan were caught in surprise when all these insecurities flared into compound crisis, thus had difficulties in responding to such acute cold-weather emergency.

Based on lessons learnt from the compound crisis of winter 2008 some UN international experts conducted risk assessment in Tajikistan to reveal the potential risks of repetition of such crisis. According to one of the key findings of the report, not only no one was able to correctly predict the compound crisis threats facing Tajikistan, also neither could anyone effectively link the spectre of water, energy, and food insecurities to appropriate pre-emptive, early recovery responses. These gaps reflected the large differences between the data which could ideally be used to track the potential risks via indicators on the one hand, and the data that were publicly available on the other.

Therefore, since Tajikistan geographically remains as a vulnerable country to a number of natural and manmade hazards, it has to have an effectively operating early warning system for timely revealing the risks of crisis and be prepared to mitigate the consequences of the disaster.

With the objectives of establishing an Early Warning System, United Nations Development Program (UNDP) within its Disaster Risk Management Program (DRMP) is determined to employ a qualified candidate for the position of National Consultant, who will facilitate the work of Humanitarian Affairs Officer in his/her responsibilities related to establishment of the Early Warning System. The National Consultant will consult/assist Humanitarian Affairs Officer with a range of tasks related to research and mapping of issues and initiatives on disasters and vulnerability. Most importantly, National Consultant will support the development and roll out of tools and guidance on specific vulnerability factors and early warning indicators, for which situational reports will be issued on monthly basis.

II. Objectives

To consult/assist the UN Country Team in Tajikistan with a range of tasks related to research and mapping of issues and initiatives on disaster risks and vulnerability, and to support the development and roll out of tools and guidance on specific vulnerability factors and effective monitoring of early warning indicators.

III. Responsibilities

The National Consultant will report directly to UNDP/DRMP Manager and Humanitarian Affairs Officer.

The National Consultant will assist the Humanitarian Affairs Officer with mapping a range of needs assessment tools and methodologies currently in use and under development in Tajikistan. Within delegated authority, the incumbent will be responsible for the following duties:

- Develop effective early warning system in close consultation with relevant governmental structures, REACT partners and donors;
- Develop a matrix for early warning indicators for continuous monitoring and data collection system;
- Establish Early Warning Centers within the government structures, if applicable;
- Ensure publication and dissemination of the final EWI analytical report on monthly (weekly and biweekly depending on situation) basis to all REACT members, donors and all related state officials;
- Make a power point presentation on situational report for REACT and other organizational meetings; as well as briefing UN Resident Coordinator on Early Warning situation on monthly basis;
- Assist with research and contribute to the preparation of reports, documents and communications, e.g. draft sections of talking points, background papers, briefings, presentations;
- Support Humanitarian Affairs Officer and DRMP in interactions with external partners, including governmental entities, UN agencies, donors and NGO community;
- Assist in the production of appeals for international assistance;
- Facilitate exchanges of professional expertise and views on specific humanitarian-related subjects/issues;
- Participate in working groups, meetings, conferences with other agencies and partners on disaster risk management, assessment and vulnerability-related matters as necessary;
- Develop and maintain reference/resource information on specific topics or related issues;
- Respond to various inquires and information request internally and externally;
- Maintain awareness of current humanitarian affairs and related issues;
- Harmonize and improve comparability among humanitarian needs assessment and analysis initiatives, in order to better analyze who is most vulnerable and why in emergency settings;
- Perform other duties as requested by supervisor;

IV. Competencies

Professionalism: Basic understanding of programming needs in disaster risk management, emergency relief assistance; basic understanding of humanitarian needs assessments methodologies and tools; good research, analytical and problem-solving skills, including ability to identify and participate in the resolution of issues/problems; familiarity with and experience in the use of various research sources, including electronic sources on the internet, intranet and other databases; ability to apply good judgment in the context of assignments given; ability to work under pressure.

Commitment to continuous learning: Willingness to keep abreast of new developments in the field of disaster risk management and vulnerability analysis, including humanitarian needs analysis and assessment initiatives.

Communications: Excellent communication (spoken and written) skills, including the ability to draft/edit a variety of written reports and communications and to articulate ideas in a clear, concise style.

Planning & Organizing: Ability to plan own work.

Technology Awareness: Fully proficient computer skills and use of relevant software and other applications, e.g. word processing, spreadsheets, internal databases, Internet, etc.

Teamwork: Good interpersonal skills and ability to establish and maintain effective partnerships and working relations with government authorities, in a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic environment with sensitivity and respect for diversity.

V. Application

Applicants are requested to send, in electronic form, by 20 January 2009:

- Cover letter;
- Detailed curriculum vitae, showing relevant publications and other relevant management and work experience, as well as references.

Attachment 6 to DFID's Concept Note

Immediate recommendations (from *Central Asian Regional Risk Assessment*⁷)

The following recommendations should be implemented immediately, in order to ensure that the UN system and the international community are not taken by surprise should the upcoming winter be as severe as last year's (or worse):

Information/communications: Urgent agreement is needed concerning what information should be communicated on a regular basis between the UN agencies, the World Bank, and other actors active in Central Asia. In this respect, a “quick and dirty” set of indicators—an “immediate early warning” mechanism—should be developed with key agencies and institutions in the next few weeks.⁸ Should the indicators in this mechanism point to risks of sufficient magnitude, the decision to invoke surge capacity may be made. A more elaborate early warning system can be discussed at a later date—most probably in February in the region with all the actors involved.

Surge capacity: The surge capacity triggered by the immediate early warning mechanism will be deployed (in collaboration with UNDP's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery) to the affected country (Tajikistan, possibly the Kyrgyz Republic) at the onset of critically bad weather.

Capacity development: UN agencies and governments alike need more capacity to work in the areas of humanitarian relief and early recovery. Humanitarian agencies (e.g., OCHA, UNHCR), governments and the developmental agencies of the UN system need to better understand each other's work in order to establish a seamless continuum between humanitarian relief and early recovery. The cluster system needs to be strengthened, in order to better respond to national needs. OCHA's implementation of the humanitarian reform in Central Asia should acquire a more proactive character, including training on leadership and management responsibilities, the cluster approach, key OCHA tools, the consolidated appeal process, and the CERF mechanism. In turn, UN country teams should help OCHA to better understand the policy and programmatic work needed to ensure the sustainability of humanitarian efforts, in coordination with government institutions.

Operations/logistics: A precautionary operational fund should be put in place to allow for quick and efficient procurement of significant non-food items (e.g., mazut), the acquisition of which necessarily differs from other NFIs commonly procured during emergency situations. Such a fund would—in justified emergency circumstances, and subject to rigorous *ex post* accountability—permit the bypassing of sometimes cumbersome procurement procedures of individual agencies and institutions.

⁷ UNDP, December 2008. For details contact ben.slay@undp.org

⁸ In the case of Tajikistan, the mechanism will be built on (or aligned with) the “Early Warning Indicators” maintained by UNDP's Disaster Risk Management Project, on behalf of the REACT Secretariat.

Sum F	ORGANISATIONAL MANAGEMENT SUPPORT				26,168		26,168	0	
Sum G	CONTINGENCY								
H	TOTAL PROJECT COST				463,952		400,000	63,952	
	Contributions from								
J1	UNDP				63,952				
J2	-Other donors (specify)								
K	REQUESTED FROM DFID				400,000				

Overall per components	
Early Warning Component	166,184
Early Recovery Component	113,600
HAO	158,000
	437,784
GMS (7%)	26,168
Grand Total	463,952